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The Physician-Patient Privilege-An
Impediment to Public Health
B. ABBOTT GOLDBERG*
Distinguished more for accuracy and brevity than for novelty is
the statement of the late Edmund M. Morgan, "A lawsuit is not,
and cannot be made, a scientific investigation for the discovery of
truth."' When I quoted this to my doctor he retorted in disgust, "I
never heard a lawyer say anything more repulsive." But the good
doctor was unmindful of the physician-patient privilege which, like
the other evidentiary privileges, gives litigants or witnesses the right
to suppress the truth-the right, for their own purposes, to interfere
with the process of rational inquiry.' So I put to him the case of
the father who sought custody of his child because the mother was
a narcotics abuser and who, to prove his point, tried to obtain her
hospital records. The court sustained the mother's objection of viola-
tion of her physician-patient privilege because the father, not the
mother, had "tendered" the question of her condition. And this under
* A.B; LL.B; Judge of the California Superior Court, Retired; Scholar in Residence
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, Sacramento, California.
1. Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence 3 (1942). Morgan was only paraphras-
ing his predecessor at Harvard Law School, James Bradley Thayer: "the theory of judicial
evidence is constantly misstated or misconceived. . . as being that which it is its chief distinc-
tion not to be-that is, as an Organon - as a sort of contrivance for the discovery of truth
S.. " And Thayer was quoting a statement of Sir Henry Maine, a generation earlier. J.
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATIsE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 508 (1898); see also
id. at 271, 274-75.
2. Morgan, supra note 1, at 7.
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the California statute which has attenuated the privilege by some twelve
exceptions.3 He was dismayed by this example and appalled when I
told him that a hospital, to impede an investigation into deaths due
to its own maladministration, had successfully asserted its patients'
privilege.'
The latter example introduces the theme of this paper:
[T]he legal paradox inherent in the fact that a suspected wrongdoer
was advancing another party's privilege to shield his own actions.
5
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH-THE OSTENSIBLE
RATIONALE OF THE PRIVILEGE ALLEGED BUT NOT PROVED.
In a bald form the privilege is that unless the patient consents,
neither a patient nor his physician can be compelled to testify to the
information the physician acquired in attending the patient and which
was necessary for the treatment.6 This privilege was unknown to the
common law. It was a statutory "innovation" in New York in 1828
justified by the Commissioners on Revision of Statutes in 1836 as
analagous to the attorney-client privilege, i.e., necessary (1) to assure
complete disclosures to physicians, and (2) to protect the professional
honor of physicians who would rather lie than disclose the secrets
of their patients.7 The first reason has since been said to be the
"historically dominant justification" for the privilege and characterized
as the "pro-public health rationale" because it is supposed to "induce
people to seek medical care." 8 As phrased by Chief Justice Traynor,
"The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation
of the patient that might follow disclosure of his ailments." 9
Protection of the patient is indeed the "whole purpose," the only
substantial reason for the privilege. The other reason given by the
New York Commissioners, that it is necessary to preclude a "struggle
between legal duty on the one hand, and [medical] professional honor
on the other,"' 0 is mistaken and illusory. It confuses with testimonial
3. Koshman v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 168 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980). See
infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
4. In re City Council of the City of New York v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d
31 (1940). See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
5. People v. Doe, 116 Misc. 2d 626, 631, 455 N.Y.S. 2d 945, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
6. Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 166, 47 P. 1019, 1022 (1897). The original
New York statute would have made the physician incompetent as a witness. Pierson v. People,
79 N.Y. 424, 432 (1880).
7. 8 J. WIoMORE, EVIDENCE §2380, at 819, §2380a, at 828-29 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
8. Note, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16 HARV. C.R.
- C.L. L. REv. 265, 271-73 (1981).
9. City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231 P.2d
26, 28 (1951).
10. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 7, §2380a, at 829.
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compulsion a physician's duty not to gossip about his patients. The
duty not to gossip may be embodied in a statute or code of medical
ethics, but it is not an excuse not to give testimony under legal
compulsion." Thus, if the patient waives his privilege, the physician
can be required to testify.' 2 But even if the patient has no privilege,
the physician is not at liberty to gossip.'3 Neither law nor ethics seems
to prevent a substantial amount of gossiping, including party chit-
chat, by physicians about their patients." Indeed, there is so much
extrajudicial disclosure of patient information that one physician has
written: "The principle of medical confidentiality described in medical
codes of ethics and still believed in by patients no longer exists. In
this respect, it is a decrepit concept."'" Unless new legislation prevents
promiscuous disclosures more effectively in the future, patient privacy
seems to be an illusion and, as a practical matter, to exist more in
court the very place where disclosure should be compelled if truth
is to be served-than it does extrajudicially.
The hypothesis that the privilege is justified as a means of protect-
ing public health by sparing patients from the humiliation that might
follow from the compulsory disclosure of their ailments persists.' 6 But
the current assertions of the hypothesis may amount to no more than
"the usual efforts to find wisdom in the established rule,"' 7 because
no one has ever been able to demonstrate that public health or recourse
to medical aid has been impeded in the handful of states that have
not adopted the privilege.'" This fact alone should make one wonder
whether the public health rationale of the privilege is only ostensible
rather than real.
11. See e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2263 (West Supp. 1983); AmERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, REVISED PRINCn'S OF MEDICAL ETcs IV (1980)("A physician... shall safeguard
patient confidences within the constraints of the law."); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 706,
287 So. 2d 824, 829 (1974). The duty now is implemented by the liquidated damages and misde-
meanor provisions of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CAL. Crw. CODE §§56.35,
56.36 (West 1982), but the Act allows disclosure by court, administrative, or arbitrator's order.
Id. §56.10(b).
12. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 430, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 838 (1972).
13. See Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 348-49 (1962) (before enact-
ment of physician-patient privilege). Cf. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328,
1335 (D.C.D.C. 1978) (violation of patient's right of privacy by physician's extrajudicial
disclosures).
14. Weiss, Confidentiality Expectations of Patients, Physicians, and Medical Students, 247
J. AM. MEDICAL Ass'N 2695 (1982).
15. Siegler, Confidentiality in Medicine-A Decrepit Concept, 397 NEW ENGLAND J.
MEDICINE 1518, 1520 (1982).
16. Camperlengo v. Blum, 56 N.Y. 2d 251, 254-55, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 1300-01, 451 N.Y.S.
2d 697, 698-99 (1982) (exception to privilege implied to facilitate detection of Medicaid fraud).
17. G. NVILUiAMs, THE PROOF OF GuiLT 47 (3d ed. 1963).
18. Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing the
Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand? 52 YALE L.J. 607, 609, 616 (1943); 19 A.L.I. PROC.
187-89 (1942).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
THE OSTENSIBLE RATIONALE CONTRADICTED
BY THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
Another reason for doubting the advisability of the privilege is the
number of exceptions to it. In its unadorned form, the privilege not
only worked but worked too well; it readily became a means of decep-
tion. For example, a patient could bring an action for personal injuries
allegedly due to an accident, testify to attendance by a physician and,
nevertheless, prevent the defendant from calling the physician to state
that he found no evidence of injury.' 9 Since actual testimony was
not necessarily a waiver of the privilege,2" it follows that merely bring-
ing an action for personal injuries is not a waiver and does not open
the door to discovery.' Such rigor in refusing to find waivers makes
the privilege, in Wigmore's terms, "a license to perjury." 22 Of course,
such rulings have in many states been ameliorated by exceptions such
as the "patient-litigant exception" to the privilege which prevents the
patient from asserting it in an action in which he tenders his physical
condition. 3 Similarly, in cases involving the capacity of a deceased
patient, the dogma that the privilege survived the death of the patient
early led to cases where the testimony of attending physicians was
excluded in will contests. These too have been since overruled or
superseded by statute. " A like problem arises with representations
for insurance policies.2" Indeed, Wigmore wrote "Ninety-nine percent
of the litigation in which the privilege is invoked" consists of these
three classes of cases, 6 and the privilege now has been generally
disallowed in these three classes either by decision or statute.
The remaining one percent of the cases also posed problems. The
unqualified language of the earlier statutes led to the bizarre but serious
argument that the patient could assert the privilege against his own
physician. Thus when a physician sued for his fees, the privilege was
applied.2 7 In malpractice cases the argument would have prevented
19. Williams v. Johnson, 112 Ind. 273, 13 N.E. 872 (1887).
20. Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E.2d 776 (1937).
21. Lambdin v. Brenton, 21 Ohio St. 2d 21, 254 N.E.2d 681 (1970); cf. Hardy v. Riser,
309 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
22. 8 J. WIGoos, EVIDENCE §2389 at 859 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
23. See, e.g., CAL. Evm. CODE §996 (West 1966).
24. Lembke v. Unke, 171 N.W.2d 837 (N.D. 1969); Haverstick v. Banet, 276 Ind. 351,
370 N.E.2d 341 (1977); CAL. EviD. CODE §§1000, 1002, 1003 (West 1966).
25. Rutten v. Investors Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 258 Iowa 749, 140 N.W. 2d 101 (1966).
Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 110, §8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1982) (Code Civ. Proc.).
26. 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, §2380a, at 831 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
27. McGillicuddy v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 26 Misc. 55, 55 N.Y.S. 242 (Sup. Ct.
1899) (privilege successfully asserted by successors of patient, otherwise known as the Duchess
de Castellucia, sued for a medical bill of $24,700).
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the defendant physician from testifying in his own behalf, a result
so unfair that it was rejected in part. A malpractice defendant could
testify despite the privilege,28 but he could not necessarily obtain the
testimony of other physicians who had treated the plaintiff. 29 From
these absurdities arose other statutes excepting cases involving the
physician-patient relationship from the privilege.3"
These illustrations are only a few of the exceptions to the privilege.
California, for example, now has twelve statutory exceptions, the most
striking of which may be that "there is no privilege . . . in a criminal
proceeding." 3' This retained the former California statute, because
"[iun view of the already questionable basis of the privilege, any
broadening of the present scope of the privilege ought to be
opposed."32 Referring to the lesser number of exceptions under the
Model Code, it has been said they "render it [the privilege] of little
practical significance." 33
PARITY OF THE LEGAL AND MEDICAL PROFESSIONS-A
REAL BUT UNJUSTIFIABLE REASON FOR THE PRIVILEGE
With the vast bulk of the cases, wherein the privilege might be
asserted eliminated by exceptions, the questions remain in what sort
of cases can it be asserted and are those cases worthy of a policy
suppressing the truth. These questions are not new, and it is sub-
mitted that the cases show that what Wigmore wrote almost eighty
years ago was correct:
There is nothing to be said in favor of the privilege, and a great
deal to be said against it. The adoption of it in any other jurisdic-
tion is earnestly to be deprecated. 34
Scholarly disapprobation of the privilege continued. Thus in the
1940's, when he was the Reporter for the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Evidence, Morgan omitted the privilege from the Code.
28. Otto v. Miami Valley Hosp., 26 Ohio Misc. 133, 266 N.E.2d 270 (C.P. 1971); Becknell
v. Hosier, 10 Ind. App. 5, 37 N.E. 580 (1894) (defendant physician's testimony allowed on
analogy to attorney-client privilege). Cf. Cramer v. Hurt, 154 Mo. 112, 55 S.W. 258 (1900) (wife's
privilege sustained in action by husband for loss of consortium).
29. Hogue v. Massa, 80 S.D. 319, 123 N.W.2d 131 (1963); Annot., 5 A.L.R. 3d 1244 (1966).
30. See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE §1001 (Vest 1966); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §2317.02(B) (Page
1981).
31. CAL. EviD. CODE §998 (West 1966).
32. California Law Revision Commission, 6 CAL. L. REvIsIoN COMM'N REPORTS 407 (1964).
The same result was reached by interpretation in some states. Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 1458 (1966).
New York is ambivalent. 59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d 678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983). See infra
notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
33. Hogue v. Massa, 80 S.D. 319, 327, 123 N.W.2d 131, 135 (1963).
34. 4 J. VIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2380 at 3352 (1905); see also 8 J. WvIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§2380a at 832 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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But when the Institute considered the Code, it granted the privileges
of the floor to a representative of the American Medical Association
who took issue with Morgan's statement that "there is not a shred
of evidence that this privilege will foster public health." 3 Stating that
he approached "the problem from the standpoint of public health," 36
the representative asserted, "all I can say is that the medical profes-
sion, out of its experience in dealing with the problem differs with
him." 37 This rebuttal was enough to persuade the Institute to adopt
the privilege with some eight or nine exceptions38 by vote of 55 to
48.19 History was to repeat itself twice. The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws originally proposed that the privilege be omitted from the
Uniform Rules of Evidence and then changed their minds.4" The
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence did not include
the privilege in its draft of the rules because
the exceptions which have been found necessary in order to obtain
information required by the public interest or to avoid fraud are
so numerous as to leave little if any basis for the privilege.4'
But when Congress rejected the proposed rules as to privilege and
adopted its own rule 501, the privilege reappeared in civil cases in
which state law "supplies the rule of decision."" 2
Chafee predicted that the failure to exclude the privilege from the
Model Code "will help make the law worse in states which have hither-
to let in the truth."4 3 He was a true prophet. From the list of twenty
states without the privilege which Dean Ladd compiled in 1942,14 there
must now be subtracted Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
and Texas. 5 Indeed, the privilege has become so commonplace that
35. 19 American Law Institute, Proceedings 187 (1942).
36. Id. at 184. For the grant of privilege of the floor to the American Medical Associa-
tion, see id. at 162, 183.
37. Id. at 186.
38. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 221-23 (1942).
39. 19 American Law Institute, Proceedings 211 (1942); Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence
in MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 329, 345-46 (1942).
40. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 119-21, 120-28 (1962); California Law Revi-
sion Commission, 6 CAL. L. REVsION COMM'N REPORTS 402 n.1 (1964).
41. Fed. R. Evid. 504 Advisory Committee Note, reprinted 11 J. MOORE, -EDERAL PRAC-
TICE, App. 1-46 (1976); Ladd, Privileges, 1969 LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 555, 580-83.
42. 10 J. MooE, FEDERAL PRACTICE V-14-V-20 (1976).
43. Chafee, supra note 18, 52 YALE L.J. at 616.
44. Ladd, supra note 39, at 345.
45. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §8-802 (Smith-Hurd 1982) (Code Civ. Proc.); MAINE RULES
OF EViDENCE, rule 5.03 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §329.26 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
84A, §§22.1-22.7 (West 1976); TExAs REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495(b), §5.08 (Vernon Supp.
1982), TEx. RULES OF EvrDENCE, rule 5.09 (1983). The New Jersey statute was adopted even
though the Supreme Court omitted it from its rules of evidence. State v. Soney, 177 N.J.
Super. 47, 55, 424 A.2d 1182, 1187 (1980); see also California Law Revision Commission,
6 CAL. L. REvwsIoN COMM'N REPORTs 416 n.13 (1964).
1985 / Physician Patient Privilege
some courts have written as if it existed in their states even though
they have no statutes creating it.
4
1
The retention and the new adoptions of the privilege may well be
due to the sentiment that if communications with lawyers are privileged,
those with doctors should be too. Morgan would have equalized the
two professions by reducing their privileges:
[T]he whole privilege of lawyer and client, except for the lawyer
who is trying the case, is an anachronism. I don't ever expect to
get an unprejudiced assembly to vote on it because it will be the
lawyers that will vote on it. If we have a bunch of doctors here,
they would vote against the lawyers' privilege and for the doctors'
privilege.
4 7
Professor Black would have equalized them by retaining the privileges.
Arguing against the proposed elimination from the Federal Rules of
Evidence, he wrote:
But, as a lawyer, I own I find it embarrassing that a group of lawyers,
having so summarily dealt with the privacies of ... medicine, pro-
ceed, without any satisfactory explanation of the vast difference, to
shield our own profession so amply. I wonder what kind of Rules
we would have gotten if the doctors had drawn them.
4 8
The theme that the two professions should be on a parity remained
constant. This lends some credence to Wigmore's undocumented asser-
tion: "The real support for the privilege seems to be mainly the weight
of professional medical opinion pressing upon the legislature."
' 49
THE PRIVILEGE AS A DETRIMENT TO PATIENTS
Hereafter follow some illustrations of some cases in which the
privilege has been invoked despite the manifold exceptions and to sug-
gest that such invocation is at odds with the ostensible purpose of
the privilege to promote public health. These are all cases in which
a third party, for his own benefit, was allowed to assert the privilege
on the theory that thereby he is protecting the privacy of the absent
46. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 438, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1236 n.3 (1982) (citing
a statute on the psychotherapist privilege); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So. 2d 232, 233
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), criticized in Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Lopez, 375 So.
2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); but see No. Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony,
397 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (deriving privilege from other statutes); Cole's
Next of Kin v. Anderson Cotton Mills, 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908 (1939), criticized in Peagler
v. Atlantic Coast Line, 232 S.C. 274, 101 S.E.2d 821, 825-26 (1958).
47. 19 A.L.I. PRoc. 162 (1942).
48. BLACK, The Marital and Physician Privileges-A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman,
1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 51.
49. 8 J. WIGmORE, EVDENCE §2380a, at 831 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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patient, although, in fact, the assertion may be to the patient's
detriment.
An old but nice example arose out of a typical San Francisco
accident-a collision between a beer wagon and a cable car. A was
injured, lingered for a while and died. The physician who treated him
was of the opinion that his death was due to his injuries. The autopsy
surgeon, however, had the contrary opinion. Held, in the
administrator's action for wrongful death, the cable car company's
objection to the treating physician's testimony was good because the
privilege survived the death of the patient. The plaintiff's objection
to the autopsy surgeon's testimony was not good because the autopsy
surgeon did not operate on a "patient" but on a "mere piece of
senseless clay beyond the reach of human prescription."" So we have
the paradoxical result that those whom the decedent would presumably
have wanted to benefit are harmed and those whom he would have
opposed are benefited. Of course, this type of situation is now covered
by the exceptions which allow personal representatives, heirs, widows,
children, and the like to waive the privilege. And the converse situa-
tion, where the treating physician had the opinion that the death was
not due to the accident is covered by the various forms of patient-
litigant exceptions. But this antique sets the tone for the argument
that the privilege may be a detriment rather than a benefit to patients.
Ti PRIVILEGE AS A DEVICE TO CONCEAL EVIDENCE
OF PHYSICIANS' AND HOSPITALS' TORTS
Suppose a patient sues a hospital on the theory that it was negligent
in allowing a physician to remain on its staff or sues a doctor for
misrepresentation of his competence or the need for surgery. Since
a history of bad results in other cases might establish either the
hospital's negligence or the doctor's fraud, the patient seeks to discover
the records of the doctor's treatment of other patients. Although the
statutes creating the privilege do not generally refer to hospital records,
it is generally held that the physician's entries in hospital records are
as privileged as his entries in his own notes, and that the hospital
may assert the privilege as well as the physician.' Doctors and hospitals
have successfully asserted the privilege when discovery has been sought
of both the names and records of other patients. Ostensibly this is
to protect the privacy of the non-party patients but, actually, of course,
50. Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 166-67, 47 P.1019, 1022 (1897). On
autopsies see 8 J. \VIoMORE, EVIDENCE §2382 at 841 n.l1 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
51. Tucson Medical Center Inc. v. Rowles, 21 Ariz. App. 424, 429-31, 520 P.2d 518, 521-23
(1974).
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it prevents discovery of the history of possible misconduct.5 2 "The
statutory privilege," wrote the Arizona Supreme Court, "was not
designed to help or protect the doctors." 53 The fact that it was not
so designed does not mean that it cannot so operate. It has also
operated to protect other recipients of privileged information such
as drug manufacturers54 and insurers.5
A practical solution in some cases has been a "protective order"
under which the party is allowed to discover records of other patients
but not their identities, the rationale being that if disclosure of the
record without the patient's name does not reveal his identity, the
patient's privacy is not impaired.5 6 But even this limited form of
disclosure has been disapproved because "in the cumulative [it] can
make the possibility of recognition very high." 57 Disclosure of records
without names may not be entirely satisfactory because it precludes
verification of the record by the patients' experience and supplemen-
tation of the record by the patients' experience as by treatment later
by other physicians in other institutions. The possibility that the names
of the patients might be disclosed to the court which could then devise
a means of contacting them to ascertain whether they are willing to
waive their privilege has been rejected:
[T]he attempt by the trial court to use the identity of the patients,
even to achieve fairness between litigants, violates the physician-
patient privilege . . . . We are not . . . concerned with adjusting
the relative unevenness of the litigants. 8
52. Marcus v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 25, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547 (1971);
Boddy v. Parker, 45 A.D.2d 1000, 358 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1974); Annot. 74 A.L.R.3d (1976). Con-
tra Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 167 (Texas, 1977) (Texas had not yet adopted the privilege,
but the court suggested that the patient's privacy might be protected by inspecting the records
in camera).
53. Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 640 P.2d 181, 182 (1982).
54. Rudnick v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 932, 523 P.2d 643, 649-50, 114 Cal. Rptr.
603, 609-10 (1974).
55. See Blue Cross of No. Calif. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 798, 801-02, 132
Cal. Rptr. 635 (1976); cf. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York v. Lopez, 375 So. 2d 59 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (error to inject medical information about strangers despite absence of
physician-patient privilege); American Health Plan v. Kostner, 367 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); No. Miami Gen. Hosp. v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, 397 So. 2d 1033, 1035
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (hospital asserted privilege against insurer; privilege derived from
other statutes in absence of physician-patient privilege).
56. Rudnick v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 933 n.13, 523 P.2d 643, 650 n.13, 114
Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 n.13 (1974); Community Hospital Association v. Dist. Ct., 194 Colo. 98,
101, 570 P.2d 243, 245 (1977) (allegations of unnecessary craniotomies); Ziegler v. Superior
Court, 134 Ariz. 390, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (allegations of unnecessary implan-
tations of pacemakers).
57. Parkson v. Central Dupage Hospital, 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 856, 435 N.E.2d 140, 144
(1982); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Peralta, 358 So.2d 232, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (alter-
native holding based on nonexistent physician-patient privilege); see Fidelity Cas. Co. of New
York v. Lopez, 375 So. 2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
58. Ziegler, 131 Ariz. at 251, 640 P.2d at 182 (1982); see id. at 392, 656 P.2d at 1253
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There seems to be no ethical objection to the minimal intrusion
on a patient's privacy of simply asking him whether he is willing to
waive his privilege. If he refuses, there is of course, a substantial
question as to whether and to what degree he should beset with solicita-
tions to change his mind.5 9 As a matter of personal injury practice,
disclosure of other patients' identities to counsel raises the specter
of solicitation of clients and proliferation of litigation 60 and this may
be the reason for the reluctance to permit it. Whatever the reason
for restricting access to other patients and their records may be, it
is not the protection of public health, for the cases in which disclosure
has been sought are not necessarily frivolous fishing expeditions. In
the Ziegler case twenty-four unidentified charts were presented to a
medical liability review panel.
Petitioner's expert witnesses testified that 20 of the 24 medical charts
represented medical malpractice by reason of unnecessary implanta-
tion of pace makers. The medical liability review panel found for
the petitioner and against both doctors ...6
The concealment of the identity of the twenty-four patients may have
contributed to the doctors' equanimity, but it is hard to see how the
concealment from at least twenty patients of the fact that they might
have causes of action contributes to public health or how it squares
with the Arizona Supreme Court's statement that the "privilege was
not designed to help or protect doctors."
' 62
The divergence between the physician-patient privilege and the goal
of protecting public health appears in In re City Council of the City
of New York v. Goldwater,63 an aging case of continuing vitality.
6
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("Under the statutory scheme, a party's need to know certain informa-
tion will not overcome a non-party's privilege . . ."); Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App.
3d 534, 548, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156 (1981).
59. Lidz, Meisel, Roth & Zimmerman, Mrs. X and the Bone Marrow Transplant, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, June 1983 at 17, discussing Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870
(Iowa 1983). A potential donor was contacted twice by the institution and declined. Id. at
873. Held, that the donor was a "patient" whose identity was excepted from disclosure under
the Public Records Act, and, therefore, the potential recipient had no right to importune her
further. Id. at 876.
60. "In substance, the purpose of giving the plaintiff this information is to enable his
investigators to seek out and interrogate Dr. Marcus' other patients and try to persuade them
to discuss their experiences with the doctor." Marcus v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 22,
24, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546 (1971). Some of these patients may have been pleased to forego
their privacy to obtain the opportunity for such a discussion. Patients may well be ignorant
of the fact that they have a cause of action. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111,
118 (1979).
61. Ziegler, 134 Ariz. at 391-92, 656 P.2d at 1252-53 (1982).
62. Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 251, 252, 640 P.2d 183 (1982).
63. 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
64. N.Y. Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 56 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 436 N.E.2d 1281,
1283, 451 N.Y.S.2d 679, 681 (1982).
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A special committee of the City Council was investigating charges
of negligence and maladministration resulting in unnecessary deaths
among patients at a city hospital. The committee subpoenaed the
records of various patients, but the administrators of the hospital
refused to comply asserting the physician-patient privilege. The Court
of Appeals upheld the claim of privilege on that ground that it applied
not only to judicial proceedings but also to the Council's investigation.
The statute providing for the privilege "should have a broad and liberal
construction." ' 65 The Court of Appeals might have better written
"literal" rather than "liberal," because its construction, which
"literal," was promptly challenged as shielding "from inquiry the very
abuse concerning which the public is entitled to full information.
' 6 6
But more than forty years were to pass before a court presented with
similar facts was to forthrightly articulate the paradox already quoted
herein.67
The occasion for the articulation was a grand jury investigation
of a hospital's practices in "no-coding" of patients, that is, classify-
ing patients into a category under which they would not be resuscitated
in the event of cardiac arrest-the problem of deciding whether treat-
ment would prolong life or merely postpone death.6 8 The Attorney
General issued grand jury subpoenas first calling for records relating
to the treatment of one seventy-eight year-old patient who had died
in the hospital's intensive care unit and later for the records of another
patient. The hospital resisted the subpoenas on various grounds
including violation of the physician-patient privilege. On these facts
it would seem that Goldwater would have required that the claim of
privilege be sustained. But the Appellate Division took a different
65. 284 N.Y. at 300, 31 N.E.2d at 32. The facts are taken from In re Lincoln Hosp.,
174 Misc. 389, 20 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1940). "Liberal" here meant "extensive." Goldwater
is opposed in philosophy to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (privileges are
exceptions to the right of the public to every man's evidence and should not be "lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.").
66. 16 INDt. L.J. 592, 593 (1941). Goldwater stimulated a spate of student comment, all
adverse. 26 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 483 (1941) ("public confidence in the medical profession
• ..thwart[ed]"); 54 HAav. L. Rv. 705, 706 (1941) ("by obstructing the discovery of truth,
presents a danger to the public welfare which is readily apparent"); 39 MICH. L. Ray. 1258,
1260 (1941) (should have "yield[ed] to a stronger policy, that of protecting all patients from
unskilled and negligent medical treatment"); 4 U. DET. L.J. 173, 174 (1941) (a "strict" rather
than "liberal" construction); 89 U. PA. L. Rv. 981, 982 (1941) ("should have weighed the
public interest").
67. People v. Doe, 116 Misc. 2d 626, 631, 455 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1982); see
supra note 5 and accompanying text.
68. In re Application to Quash, 56 N.Y.2d 348, 351, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1119, 452 N.Y.S.2d
361, 362 (1982). "No-coding" concerns the right to die with dignity. There is a vast literature
on the philosophical, ethical and moral problems involved. For a discussion in a legal context
see Note, No Code Orders v. Resuscitation: The Decision to Withhold Life Prolonging Treat-
ment from the Terminally Ill, 26 WAYNE L. Rav. 139 (1979).
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tack, one that had been suggested as early as 1941 in a student
comment,69 and applied the reasoning of People v. Lay.7"
In Lay the defendant was convicted of shooting a woman. The physi-
cian who extracted the bullet was allowed to testify over the defen-
dant's objection based on the physician-patient privilege. The objec-
tion was held properly overruled on the alternative grounds that the
privilege was not intended to "be the means of protecting a criminal
from just punishment," particularly since the disclosure did not
embarrass the patient, and that the statutory requirement that physi-
cians report bullet wounds "militates against a construction [of the
privilege] favorable to a defendant in a criminal cause." Further-
more, as a general proposition, the scope of the privilege "should
be limited to its purpose." 7' The tone of Lay is thus contrary to the
"liberal construction" note sounded two years later in Goldwater,
and Goldwater does not mention Lay.
In the "no-code" case, the Appellate Division cited Lay as authority
that the privilege cannot be invoked by or on behalf of a patient
when the patient "is merely the victim of a crime for which another
has been criminally charged." 72 Goldwater was dismissed as a "cf."
for the proposition that the security provisions of the grand jury system
negated a claim of invasion of the patient's constitutional right of
privacy.7 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed. It expanded Lay by ignor-
ing Lay's reference to a reporting requirement and cited it for the
general proposition that there is a "pragmatic limitation" on the rule
that a physician may assert the privilege on behalf of a patient who
has not waived it:
[A] person or entity subject to proceedings for having committed
a crime against an individual should not be permitted to assert the
victim's physician-patient privilege as a bar to production of rele-
vant medical records or testimony. . . . Since the hospital was a
central figure in this investigation, it should not be permitted to suc-
cessfully assert the physician-patient privilege of its patients in this
instance.
74
And to complete the demotion of Goldwater initiated by the Appellate
Division, the Court of Appeals simply did not mention it.
69. 26 CORNELL L. Rav. at 483 n.14 (1941).
70. 254 A.D. 372, 5 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1938), aff'd 279 N.Y. 737, 18 N.E.2d 686 (1939).
71. 254 A.D. at 373, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
72. People v. Doe, 86 A.D.2d 672, 673, 446 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384 (1982).
73. Id. at 673, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
74. In re Application to Quash, 56 N.Y.2d 348, 437 N.E.2d 1118, 1120, 452 N.Y.S.2d
361, 363 (1982).
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When the "no-code" case returned to the trial court additional sub-
poenas were issued. Whereas the original subpoenas had named
patients, the new ones called for the records of "all patients" who
had been in the hospital's intensive care unit or on respirators during
a particular period. The hospital resisted these on the ground, among
others, that Lay applied only to records of a victim or suspected vic-
tim, i.e., that it was only a partial rather than a total abrogation
of the hospital's right to assert the privilege. The trial court over-
ruled this contention. It interpreted the opinion of the Court of Appeals
to show that it "is adhering to a practical view regarding privileges
in connection with grand jury investigations."" And it applied a prac-
tical view. The proceeding was still in an investigatory stage when
''no one can say with any degree of legal certainty whether any other
patients might have been the victims of similar or related crimes."
Once there is evidence that one patient has been subjected to possible
criminal activities, the hospital may not assert the privilege "to block
a grand jury from investigating the records of any patient connected
with the act." The patients would be protected from disgraceful
disclosures by the secrecy of the grand jury.76
The "no-code" cases are an example of one technique to dispose
of an awkward precedent-first belittle it and then ignore it. 77 But
they have not eliminated the physician-patient privilege in grand jury
proceedings. Some weeks after the trial court opinion the Appellate
Division upheld a hospital's objections, based on the privilege, to a
grand jury subpoena. The grand jury had demanded the hospital to
produce the records of "all patients treated for knife wounds during
a three day period." The Appellate Division distinguished the
"no-code" cases on the ground that the hospital was not the subject
of any investigation and so could assert the privilege. And the privilege
was not negated by any reporting requirement since the statutes
required only the reporting of "bullet wounds and other wounds likely
to result in death." "Significantly," the Legislature "has not required
the reporting of stab wounds not likely to result in death."' "7 The
conclusion is acceptable as a matter of technical exegesis of the
authorities, although it is hard to see what practical or pragmatic goal
75. People v. Doe, 116 Misc. 2d 626, 632, 455 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
76. Id. at 632-33, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 950. But cf. In re Investigation of Criminal Abortions
in Kings County, 286 A.D. 270, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955) (grand jury may obtain records only
of criminal abortions but not of all abortions to see if they were criminal.) The physician-
patient privilege is "sacrosanct." Id. at 275, 143 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
77. See 0. CABARREsI, A COMfON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs 172-77 (1982).
78. In re Grand Jury Investigation, Onondaga County, 90 A.D.2d 990, 456 N.Y.S.2d 586
(1982); aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 130, 450 N.E.2d 678, 463 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1983).
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it serves. It does point up, however, that the physician-patient privilege,
in the rather pristine form in which it exists in New York where it
applies to criminal cases and can be asserted before a grand jury,
can disrupt the administration of the criminal law as well as efforts
to promote public health. The privilege has even been asserted as a
device to conceal possible Medicaid frauds. The assertion was unsuc-
cessful because the court found that the federal and state reporting
requirements, with their provisions for confidentiality, constituted an
implied exception to the privilege. 79
AMELIORATION OF THE PRIVILEGE BY MAKING IT
CONDITIONAL RATHER THAN ABSOLUTE-THE FUTILITY
OF PROLIFERATING EXCEPTIONS
Short of outright abolition of the privilege, two ways have been
found to avoid its strangling technicalities and paradoxical results.
The one is by creating exceptions; the other is by making the privilege
conditional.
California is an example of the first method. The California Evidence
Code "does not apply in grand jury proceedings." 8 The Penal Code,
however, provides that a grand jury "shall receive none but evidence
that would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal
action." 8' The Evidence Code, in turn, provides, as California law
has always provided, that the physician-patient privilege does not apply
"in a criminal proceeding." '8 2 Although one has to shuttle back and
forth in the statute books to find it, the answer is clear enough-the
physician-patient privilege does not apply to grand jury proceedings
in California.
There is a verbal distinction, if not an actual one, between Goldwater
and the "no-code" cases. Goldwater involved a subpoena from an
administrative agency; the "no-code" cases involved subpoenas from
a grand jury. It is conceivable that some argument could have been
based on history or tradition or sentiment to rationalize giving a grand
jury more extensive authority than a "mere" administrative body.
But this sort of superficial justification has, as far as has been found,
not been attempted by the courts. Instead, a different way has been
found to ignore Goldwater. Camperlengo v. Blum83 concerned an
administrative subpoena to a psychiatrist for the records of 35 of his
79. Camperlengo v. Blum, 56 N.Y.2d 251, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 451 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1982).
80. CAL. EVID. CODE §300 (West Supp. 1983).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE §939.6(b) (West 1970).
82. CAL. EVID. CODE §998 (West 1966).
83. 56 N.Y.2d 251, 436 N.E.2d 1299, 451 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1982).
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patients issued by a state department investigating Medicaid frauds.
The psychiatrist's objection on the basis of the physician-patient
privilege was overruled on the ground that the federal and state record-
keeping and reporting requirements relative to Medicaid patients
"evidence a clear intention to abrogate the physician-patient privilege
to the extent necessary to satisfy the important public interest in see-
ing that Medicaid funds are properly applied." 4 This conforms to
the alternative holding in People v. Lay,15 that the statutory require-
ment of reporting bullet wounds "militates" against the privilege. The
reason, not elaborated in the New York cases, perhaps because it is
so obvious, is that "no valid purpose is served by preventing the use
of relevant information that is required to be reported and made
public." 86 Of course, the disclosure may be limited to a relevant
audience rather than to the general public. 7
California anticipated and avoided the problem of interpreting
reporting requirements vis-a-vis the privilege by adopting an express
exception88 derived from the Uniform Rules of Evidence. And it went
beyond the Uniform Rules by providing further exceptions making
the privilege inapplicable in licensing proceedings and in investiga-
tions by the medical licensing agency.8
By proliferating statutory exceptions, California has spared itself
the need to engage in the judicial gymnastics that have exercised the
courts in New York. Nothing has been found to show that these
exceptions have humiliated any patients to a degree affecting their
health or at all, a fact that fortifies the suggestion that the privilege
is based on an unprovable hypothesis. But the most diligent ingenuity
cannot anticipate beforehand all the instances where an exception to
the privilege may be desirable, and recognition of this inability leads
to the second method of avoiding the adverse consequences of the
privilege, making it conditional.
In Virginia and North Carolina the privilege is expressly subject
to the power to compel disclosure when disclosure "is necessary to
84. Id. at 255-56, 436 N.E.2d at 1301, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
85. 254 A.D. 372, 5 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1938). See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
86. California Law Revision Commission, 6 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 237
(1964) (comment on the express exception in Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 27 P (5)); cf.
8 J. WIo oRE, EVIDENCE §2385a, at 850 (MeNaughton rev. 1961) (death certificates).
87. Camperlengo v. Blum, supra, 56 N.Y.2d at 256, 436 N.E.2d at 1301, 451 N.Y.S.2d
at 699.
88. CAL. EviD. CODE §1006 (West 1966). Hospitals are required to keep patient records
which are subject to inspection by the licensing agency. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1254
(\vest 1979); 22 CAL. ADni. CODE §§70101, 73543 (1983).
89. CAL. Evm. CODE §1007 (West 1966); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§2225, 2226 (West
Supp. 1983) (generally confidential until proceedings instituted); see also Board of Medical Quality
Assurance v. Ham, 135 Cal. App. 3d 561, 566, 185 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (1982).
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[the] proper administration of justice." 90 Based on these statutes,
California adopted a form of this dispensing authority limited to cases
to recover damages "on account of the conduct of the patient." 9'
The authority was limited lest it be extended to malpractice actions
92
- a perhaps realistic apprehension that a broader bill would engender
opposition from medical or allied interests. In New York, however,
the Law Revision Commission has recommended a bill which it
describes as providing:
There is no privilege as to a communication relevant to the physical
condition of the patient in any action or proceeding "in which the
interests of justice require disclosure of the communication," even
if the patient does not rely upon the condition as an element or
claim or defense . . . . This provision is premised on recognition
that there are situations where the condition of the patient will be
of great concern to the court regardless of the manner in which the
condition is raised, justifying disclosure.
93
The recommendation is based, in part, on People ex rel Chitty v.
Fitzgerald,94 a proceeding to alter a husband's visitation rights because
he was allegedly mentally ill. The husband refused to submit to an
examination by the Veterans Administration and claimed the physician-
patient privilege as to his hospital records. The court overruled the
claim of privilege, examined the hospital records and denied the hus-
band further visitation until he had submitted to an examination. The
claim of privilege was denied because "the dominant consideration
is the welfare of the child." Therefore, "in the exercise of the court's
inherent power to do what is best to protect the welfare of the in-
fant, the right of the petitioner [husband] to invoke the physician-
patient privilege must yield to the paramount rights of the infant."95 In
the version of the code the Commission circulated for comment prior
90. N.C. Gen. Stat. §8-53 (1981); Va. Code §8.01-399 (1977). See Carter v. Colonial Life
& Acc. Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 893, 897 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (dictum that only trial judge,
as distinguished from judge who ordered pre-trial depositions, may exercise the authority).
91. CAL. Evm. CODE §999 (vest Supp. 1983); California Law Revision Commission, 12
CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 607 n.11 (1974).
92. California Law Revision Commission, 12 CAL. L. REvISION COMM'N REPORTS 605 n.
6 (1974).
93. N.Y. State L. Revision Comm'n, Code of Evidence Submitted to the 1982 Session
of the Legislature 102 (West 1982). The quotation is a comment on proposed §509, 1 (d)(4),
providing there is no privilege:
As to a communication relevant to the physical condition of the patient in any action
or proceeding in which the patient or his representative relies upon the condition
as an element of a claim or defense, or in which the interests of justice require
disclosure of the communication.
Id. at 97-98. Query if the placement of the provision makes it applicable only in cases to
which the patient is a party, despite the breadth of the Commission's comment.
94. 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
95. 40 Misc. 2d at 967, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
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to submitting it to the legislature, the Commission had included Chitty
among the cases it disparaged as being one of the "numerous judge-
made exceptions to the patient's privilege." The Commission declin-
ed to follow Chitty.9 6 Something happened between the original cir-
culation of the proposal in 1980 and the submission to the legislature
in 1982 to cause the Commission to change its mind. One could sur-
mise that it was the California case, similar to Chitty except that the
privilege was claimed by a mother allegedly a narcotics user rather
than a mentally ill husband. 97 The claim of privilege was sustained
because none of the exceptions was literally applicable. The court's
suggestion that the legislature enact a further exception9" seems, as
yet, not to have been heeded.
The suggestion that the privilege be made conditional is open to
the superficial objections that "an uncertain privilege or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all," '99 and that "many
human interests are more important than the conduct of whatever
litigation may from time to time arise." ' But if the condition for
dispensing with the privilege is protection of the public health, the
first objection is certainly weakened if not eliminated. And the second
objection was based on deliberate disregard of the exceptions to the
privilege.
CONCLUSION
The exceptions have eliminated patients' privacy in the cases where
it would be most to their advantage. And maintenance of the privilege
allows a minimal and protectable interest in privacy to be asserted
to protect fraudulent and incompetent health providers. It seems
obvious that such protection is not an important human interest. What
96. N.Y. Stat. L. Revision Comm'n, Proposed Code of Evidence 78 (vest 1980) (com-
ment to §504 (d) ("The [physician-patient] privilege will apply even in . . . child custody
or visitation proceedings").
97. Koshman v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 294, 168 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980). The
change may have been due to the criticism that the original version was too inflexible. Note,
Patient Testimonial Privileges Under the Proposed Code of Evidence for New York, 45 ALB.
L. REv. 773, 787-88 (1981).
98. Ill Cal. App. 3d at 299 n.5, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 460 n.5.
99. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
100. Black, supra note 48, at 51.
101. Black, supra note 48, at 50. ("These statutes [the physician-patient privilege] often
contain exceptions; the reasonableness of these-and some do seem reasonable-is not in issue
here.") See H. Mencken, The Divine Afflatus, in THE AMERICAN SCENE 503 (H. Cairns ed.
1965) ("The formula of the argument is simple and familiar: to dispose of a problem all that
is necessary is to deny that it exists.").
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is clear is that neither abolition of the privilege nor making it condi-
tional would license health providers to promiscuously make patient
information available. Like the vermiform appendix, the physician-
patient privilege remains a vestigeal remnant having no useful func-
tion but capable of much harm.
